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Abstract
This is a survey of the systematic study of weak axiom systems for Arithmetic (in short:
“Weak Arithmetics”), which plays a growing and unifying role in various kinds of investigations:
1. exploring the boundaries of Solvability with the help of computer experiments and results as
well as conjectures from Number theory,
2. developing solvable versions of the “P versus NP” issues, to get around the present unsolv-
ability of these problems,
3. reclaiming over the Unsolvable a friendly environment for the working Mathematician, Com-
puter Scientist or Engineer — through the discovery of good extensions of Monadic Second
Order Arithmetic; of Real Closed Fields axioms; and of other powerful yet pathology-free
theories.
c© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
0. Introduction: JAF and Weak Arithmetic (“JAF” is the french acronym for
“Days on Weak Arithmetics”)
In my opinion, the most e<ective reason for the birth of “JAF” is the excess of
energy and dynamism of Denis Richard, which makes him lure his colleagues (such
as myself) into collective action with him!
This being said, the title JAF gives another more o?cial reason for these meetings:
the study of Weak Arithmetics (in short: WAs). But no explicit de@nition of this theme
has been given at the start (at least to me). The advantage of such an imprecision
is that the @rst 13 instances of JAF have been remarkably oecumenic, providing an
instructive interplay of an ever varying sample of current Math, of TCS and of Logic.
Jaf 13 is exemplary in this respect, and I especially thank Maurice Margenstern – for
this and for the warm hospitality o<ered in Metz. But now that this inter-disciplinary
tradition is well established, it is perhaps time to propose a reCection on what is a
Weak Arithmetic and why is “weakness” desired, here.
E-mail address: ressayre@logique.jussieu.fr (J.-P. Ressayre).
0304-3975/01/$ - see front matter c© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S0304 -3975(00)00106 -7
2 J.-P. Ressayre / Theoretical Computer Science 257 (2001) 1–15
I expose some @rst thoughts of this kind; they give motivations and depth to the
subject. But I do not propose a comprehensive notion of WA, nor do I try to be ex-
haustive in any respect. Besides, I am very dependent on my background as a logician.
So I am glad that Denis Richard o<ers another view of the subject; and this Note calls
for a dialog with other JAF contributors.
Problems which are unsolvable – in theory, in practice or both – abound in
Math+TCS: Unsolvability is the rule and Solvability is the exception. In order to
cope with this fundamental reality one is driven to systematic studies of a large variety
of WAs. In fact, there are basically four ways to handle Unsolvability; and in order
to develop each way a speci@c chapter is needed from the studies in WA. This is the
theme developed by the four sections of this paper.
[Nota Bene: in this paper “Unsolvability” refers both to undecidability of sets and
to independence of statements]
So much for preliminaries: the @rst section begins, devoted to the @rst of the four
strategies.
1. Eluding unsolvability: classical number theory and WA
(A) Imagine that you can select a few problems in a given domain that are
– hard enough to keep mathematicians busy for ages;
– but still easy enough to be solvable in the long range.
If you are able to convince the mathematical community to work on these problems
and forget about the rest, this will turn the wilderness of “unsolvability-as-the-rule” into
a more favorable environment: no more unsolvability within this restricted framework;
yet problems remain hard enough to challenge man. And since you selected only few
problems, you avoid scattering man’s e<orts: : :
Well, this strategy has been tried by the great number of theorists of the 19th century:
there is a famous letter of Gauss stating that he knows only too many problems like
Fermat’s one: : : And his fellows worked in the same spirit – for excellent reasons: they
knew that the simplest looking questions in Number theory often hide discouraging
mysteries, so that this strategy was indeed wise. Thus, the conjectures emphasized in
classical Number theory result from a conscious attempt to create the above “favorable
environment”.
(B) Some of the @rst studies in WA have:
– de@ned “Primitive Recursive Arithmetic” PRA,
– proved that it is much weaker than “Peano’s Arithmetic” PA,
– shown that classical Number theory as a whole is in principle formalizable in
PRA
– not only in strong axiom systems such as ZF set theory.
Remark 1. (a) The large gap in strength between PRA and PA becomes gigantic
between PA and second-order Arithmetic A2; and becomes “beyond any description”
J.-P. Ressayre / Theoretical Computer Science 257 (2001) 1–15 3
between A2 and ZF. This raises a problem for logicians, and a blatant one: what is
the use of this unlimited reserve in strength of axioms that lies between PRA and ZF
(and beyond)?
(b) In practice, the formalization of classical Number Theory in PRA needs much
longer, cumbersome proofs than in ZF; so that its existence is not fully documented
by written proofs. For parts of it see for instance [19, 5, 18].
(c) Thus strong axioms are in practice needed to keep proofs readable. This is one
@rst sensible answer to (a) from the practical point of view. Looking at (a) from
the theoretical point of view now, ZF (and more than ZF) is needed for the study
of “Cantor’s paradise”. But this goes without saying; so the main remaining part of
question (a) is:
are there down to earth results about integers which are provable from strong axioms
but not from PRA or PA?
(d) What “down to earth” means is imprecise; but it de@nitely excludes metamathe-
matical statements such as Con PA, Con ZF (so that Goedel’s theorem has no bearing
on question (c)). For reasons that were showing through (A), people have come to
identify the “down to earth properties of integers” with the properties of classical
Number theory; thus they identify question (c) with:
are there conjectures of classical Number theory which are provable from strong
axioms, but not from PRA or PA?
(e) So far, it is quite plausible that the answer to question (d) is no: for instance
Riemann’s Hypothesis may be settled in PRA some day. People then tend to infer that
the answer to question (c) also is no:
down-to-earth properties of integers do not depend on strong axioms (except for
making proofs readable).
(f) Only the future can say if this conclusion is right; but remember from (A) that the
conjectures of classical Number theory were deliberately chosen in the hope of eluding
unsolvability. So you can observe a serious Caw in the reasoning that leads to the
conclusion (e): to give a comparison imagine that someone gives you an enumeration
of integers which all are prime; if you know that this was his very intention, then
you can infer that this person knows about primes but not that composites are rare or
missing among integers!
The philosophical issue we just discussed rests on imprecise concepts. It would
become hopelessly imprecise and could not be pursued without the above analysis of
the role of PRA. And this matters because the issue is also practical in addition to
philosophical – as will appear in Section 3, Remark 0c and Section 4. This is one
bene@t of the above study in WAs; let us mention two others.
Remark 2. (a) By applying proof theoretic techniques to the formalization in PRA of
the theorem of Hardy–Littlewood on prime numbers, Kreisel gave a precise primitive
recursive bound for this theorem, at a time when number theorists knew no e<ective
bound at all. (Afterwards they much improved on Kreisel’s bound by use of their
methods; but note that Kreisel extracted his bound from a @xed proof while they were
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changing and improving this proof.) This was the @rst application of proof theory to a
concrete speci@c proof. It was done by man, now computers slowly learn to use these
techniques: : :
(b) The consistency of PRA seems particularly certain: in any case that of PA or
ZF cannot be as secure, because of Goedel’s theorem. Thus classical Number theory
respects a particularly high standard of mathematical certainty. The above “study in
WAs” is the way to show it.
So far we came across one “Weak Arithmetic”: PRA. And for its study and use the two
main techniques were: showing that certain number theoretic results have a proof in
that WA; and eliminating cuts from these proofs. In the following these two techniques
will have wide applications with other suitable WAs; but also very di<erent techniques
will be used.
2. Exploring unsolvability: WA in the spirit of J. Robinson and I. Matijassevich
(a) Here “problem” means: algorithmic problem (hence a problem is a set whereas in
Section 1 it meant an unsettled statement). Thus here unsolvable problem means:
semi-e<ective undecidable set. The exploration of Unsolvability thus includes a
well-developed and extensive chapter of TCS: for a big number of problems D,
TCS has proved D to be undecidable or has provided D with a decision algorithm
and has determined the complexity class of D – D is P-time, NP-complete, etc.,
structural complexity is also determined: D is regular, context-free, etc.
(b) Note the complete change of strategy from Section 1 to Section 2: here instead
of eluding Unsolvability one systematically explores and measures it. This is in
tune with the dramatic change brought to Math by the Computer: classical Number
theory had good reasons to concentrate on a few selected problems; whereas the
Computer is such a good reason to explore as many problems as you can think
of: : : that we are compelled to do so.
(c) The studies in WAs associated to this context are especially rich: they include the
celebrated work of Robinson, of Matijassevich; and they are @rst among the topics
of JAF. This richness is too challenging for me and I am not in a position to give
an account of it. But the reader will @nd this account in Richard’s introduction
to this volume. He will then see that these studies in WAs are tied up with the
results but also with the big conjectures in Number Theory. Also, ties are showing
up with numerical experimentation on the Computer. These ties are precisely the
desired ones, to @t with the above remark (b). Note that the main tools of these
studies in WA are quite di<erent from the ones of Section 1: Number Theory and
computer explorations in place of Proof Theory and weak axiomatizability.
(d) Let us mention as a @nal remark that the kind of “Weak Arithmetic” involved
here is also quite di<erent: the WAs that are most typical in the part surveyed
by Richard are the complete ones (here denoted as CWA). Namely, theory T is a
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CWA i< T is the complete theory of a structure M such that: M is interpretable
in (N;+; :) but not conversely. Note that if T is complete and decidable then by
Goedel’s completeness + incompleteness theorems, T is a CWA. And in practice
if one succeeds in showing that a given T is a CWA, one is often able to show
the decidability of T. Since PRA is essentially undecidable we are thus far from
Section 1.
3. Confronting with unsolvability: WA and solvable forms of the P versus NP issues
Remark 0. (a) The “exploring” strategy of Section 2 is opposite to the “eluding” one
of Section 1. But only partially so, because when the exploration hits an unsolvable
problem its goal is simply to prove this matter of fact without trying to overcome
it. The full opposition comes when one insists on solving or solving approximately a
problem even after this has turned out to be impossible – in practice or in theory. Such
is the “confronting” strategy discussed here. It deals with “problems” both in the sense
of a statement to be settled as in Section 1, and in the sense of a set to be decided
as in Section 2. (In fact, it deals with statements to be settled, but these statements
concern sets to be decided with limited resources.)
(b) The Computer brings two compelling reasons for confronting us with certain
problems although they seem to be too hard. The @rst reason is: problems tied up
with the “P versus NP” issue are so much encountered in applications that even if
some day logicians proved that the whole issue is independent say of ZF, Computer
practitioners would undisturbed keep on asking questions which make us confront this
issue. (By “P versus NP” I mean not only the question whether P is di<erent from
NP, but also all related questions of collapse and non-collapse in the P-time hierarchy
and in other subexponential time hierarchies. And this includes special instances such
as the complexity of primality and of factorization.)
(c) The second reason which forces CS to confront perhaps “hopeless” challenges
is that the most important single property of the Computer is its universality.
(For universality is so strong a property that it characterizes the Computer – up
to much more commonplace ones. And the Cexibility it provides is such a decisive
advantage that it would be absurd to shrink CS in a way that prohibits universality –
except of course by imposing resource bounds that correspond to what is “feasible”; but
the Computer is then universal: : : in practice and in the chosen resource bound class.)
Now once we are not allowed to give up universality, then for instance the P versus
NP issue concerns not only the set of primes and a few other sets selected by classical
Number theory and by practice in order to elude Unsolvability: the issue also concerns
P and NP sets with a de@nition so complicated that only the Computer is ever able to
make sense of that de@nition. But then the issue may well be hardened in proportion
with this dramatic increase in complexity – in which case P versus NP would be about
as hard as Math as a whole.
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So let us confront P versus NP ! To begin with, the use of suitable WAs is a simple
but very e<ective tool to start this confrontation in a smooth but fruitful way:
(A) WAs and the mellowing of “P versus NP”
Let T be a WA; here are three types of questions which have deep relations with
the various “P versus NP” issues.
Q1. Can we prove the “T-version of P=NP∩ co− NP” – which says:
if X is NP∩ co−NP moreover if this can be (expressed and) proved in T, then X
is in P
Q2 and 2′. What are the “upper and lower bounds of provability in T”: which
signi@cant results (in Number Theory and in CS) can be proved in T and which ones
are independent of T. In particular, construct models of T in which various collapse
properties are satis@ed or falsi@ed.
Q3. Let C be a complete system of proof for the Propositional Calculus; obtain
lower bounds (in length) on any function which to a tautology F associates a proof of
F in C.
The reason for asking Q3 is that the conjecture: NP =co− NP is equivalent to the
existence (for each possible C) of a superpolynomial lower bound. But this makes Q3
a very hard question for most C’s. So in replacement we consider a weak Arithmetic
T and ask the question below which is the “T-version of NP =co− NP”:
Q3′. Prove the lower bounds asked by Q3, but only in case the soundness of C can
be proved from T.
Below I give (but a few) examples of the work done on these questions and I discuss
their signi@cance.
Notation. (a) In these examples, the language of T contains +; : ; 0; 1;¡ and sometimes
additional symbols such as exponentiation xy, or l(x) (= binary length of x) and xl(y).
T has induction axioms: if D is a class of sets, we call D-induction the induction
axioms
if [A(0) and for all xA(x) implies A(x + 1)], then for all xA(x)
for each formula A (with parameters) which canonically expresses a set of D in the
language of T.
T also has basic axioms for each symbol of its language; they include the axioms
of discrete ordered semiring. We omit to mention the basic axioms below, so that
T is often named after its induction scheme: T=NP-induction, for instance. We let
D-induction up to l(x) denote D-induction when the conclusion “for all xA(x)” is
weakened to:
“for all xA(l(x))”.
(b) We also consider T=RECFI (“Real Exponential Closed Fields with Integral
Part”), the second-order Arithmetic such that (R; Z) is a model of RECFI i< R is a
model of the complete theory of (R;+; : ; xy) and Z is an “Integral Part” of R: that is
Z is a subring, Z+ is closed under xy and for all x in R there is a unique element a
of Z such that a¡x¡a+ 1 (a is the “integral part of x in Z”).
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Answers to Q1
Theorem 1. – The T -version of “P = NP∩ co− NP” holds:
– when T =NP-induction up to l(x) [2];
– when T =RECFI [16].
Remark 1. (a) Actually, one proves a strengthening of Theorem 1 called witnessing
theorem for T
if for some NP relation R, T proves that
“for all x there is y of polynomially bounded size such that R(x; y)”
then there is a P-time function f such that T proves
“for all xR(x; f(x))”.
(b) The two theories T of Theorem 1 are utterly weak compared with PRA: NP-
induction up to l(x) does not prove that 2x exists for all x. RECFI does it of course but
implies induction only for formulas involving no quanti@cation over integers (quanti@-
cation over reals is allowed)
(c) Thus, in particular, Theorem 1 only proves a tiny bit of “P=NP∩ co− NP”;
yet this bit su?ces to provide Theorem 1 with signi@cant applications. In particular,
the result of Buss characterizes P-time as the class of functions with NP graph that
are provably total in NP-induction up to l(x); a characterization which was widely ex-
tended, re@ned and imitated. Among others this has been quite e<ective for developing
the domain of “resource bound programming languages”
Answers to Q2: provability results
Remark 2. (a) Witnessing theorems such as Theorem 1 and Remark 1a imply that
when you succeed in proving number theoretic or computer theoretic statements in a
very weak Arithmetic, you may be rewarded by performing algorithms.
Example 1. If you succeeded in proving “primality is in NP” from NP-induction up
to l(x) or from RECFI, then using Theorem 1 you would prove no less than: primality
in P.
Example 2. Let PTH denote the Polynomial Time Hierarchy, union of the classes:
1(pol) (=NP), 2(pol) (=NP relative to an NP oracle), 3(pol), and so on. If
the theorem of Matijassevich was provable in PTH-induction, this would imply the
collapse of PTH onto NP.
(b) The two examples are hypothetical, and nobody expects their assumption to be-
come true. (In Example 2 it would imply an unlikely collapse; and the collapse implied
by Example 1 is expected to hold but to be so challenging that its axiomatizability
inside NP-induction up to l(x) seems unbelievable.) But here is a recent provability
result that is likely to have remarkable consequences via witnessing theorems:
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Theorem 2 (de Aquino and Macintyre [1]). PTH-induction proves that every 8nite
8eld has a unique extension of degree n.
Theorem 2 is surprising because every former proof of this fundamental theorem of
@nite @elds makes essential use of the exponential function; whereas PTH-induction
does not imply at all the existence of functions with exponential growth rate.
Here is another, less recent result: the theorem of Matijassevich is provable in dio-
phantine induction. And also in: bounded diophantine induction plus exp; where exp
is the axiom: 20 = 1 and 2x+1 =2x:2
The proof rests on an amazing bootstrapping argument, [11]. These “studies in WAs”
continue the one recalled in Section 1(A) but with much weaker axioms in place of
PRA hence with very new proofs and with the potential pointed out by Remark 2.
Answers to Q2′: unprovability results
Pratt proved that primality is in NP. Then in view of Theorem 1 and Example 1,
an unprovability that one has to be sure of is the unprovability of Pratt’s result from
NP-induction up to l(x) or from RECFI. And because of Example 2 one has to be
sure that the theorem of Matijassevich is unprovable in PTH-induction. Well, the hard
work done on these two almost certain conjectures only produced partial results:
Theorem 2 (Boughattas [4]). Let RECFI(2x) denote the weakening of RECFI where
the Integral Part is closed only under 2x (instead of xy); RECFI(2x) does not prove
“primality in NP” (nor does it prove primality to be diophantine).
Remark 2′. (a) From 2x to xy the gap is small, yet this small gap su?ces to transform
the problem solved by Theorem 2′ into an unsolved challenge. And Boughattas has
similar results for theories slightly weaker than NP-induction up to l(x); but again the
“small” remaining gap turns out to be a challenging one.
(b) On the other hand (see [12]), NP-induction up to l(x) does not prove “P=NP∩
co− NP”.
Answers to Q3+3′
Remark 3. – Here lies the part of this section which got the widest recognition:
Razborov received the Nevanlinna prize of Applied Math for his work in this domain,
see Chapter 3 of [12].
Remark 3′. – Still, one aspect of this domain is little known: it proves T-versions of
“NP =co− NP” just as Theorem 1 proves T-versions of “P=NP∩ co− NP”. And so
far there has been a systematic correspondence between the two kinds of T-versions:
every strengthening of T that is obtained for (the T-version of) P=NP∩ co− NP
allows to prove the same strengthening for NP =co− NP and conversely. There are
reasons for such a correspondence to work in general, even for much stronger T. This
is part of a fascinating perspective discussed in the next remark.
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Remark 4. From weak versions of “P versus NP”, to the main issues themselves.
(a) PTH-induction, and actually perhaps already T=V2(pol)-induction might be able
to prove that primality is NP∩ co− NP; thus by Remark 2 the extension of Theo-
rem 1a to this still quite weak theory T would already imply no less than: primality
is in P.
(b) This makes it clear that for strong T (already for T=PRA !) the T-version of
“P=NP∩ co− NP” is almost as good as the full statement.
(c) But (a) also illustrates the fact that when the strength of T increases, then the
di?culty of proving the T-versions gets a fantastic boost. This is witnessed by
(a) at the level around NP-induction; but there are general reasons to expect the
phenomenon to go on up to ZF and beyond: : : It suggests that “P=NP∩ co− NP”
could be unprovable from whatever strong axioms we may rely on: : :
(d) But what evidence do we have that “P=NP∩ co− NP” could be true (or almost
true in the sense of (b))? We have results such as Theorem 1 – but they are
relatively weak. And we have aesthetic reasons: namely P=NP∩ co− NP would
be an appealing situation – a reason for being true that works perhaps more often
in Math than in the real world: : :
(e) Be it as it may, the evidence provided by (d) remains scarce, so remark (c)
would lead us to expect that “P=NP∩ co− NP” is just false. But here is one
more evidence in addition to (d): NP is almost certainly di<erent from co-NP,
and if we accept the plausible correspondence between T-versions mentioned by
Remark 3′ then the high plausibility of each T-version of “NP =co− NP” implies
the plausibility of each T-version of “P=NP∩ co− NP”. The same correspondence
but in the opposite direction transfers the expected enormous di?culty in proving
“P=NP∩ co− NP” to the proof of “NP =co− NP” (Nota Bene: the di?culty of
the latter conjecture is an empirical fact, but came as a surprise and is otherwise
unexplained).
Thus we are led to a general picture: (i) NP di<ers from co-NP; (ii) P almost equals
NP∩ co− NP; (iii) but both facts are unprovable because they are “too hard to prove”
for each given strong theory that we can rely on.
There is no reason to make this picture become an act of faith or a dogma: it is a
working hypothesis that has to be investigated in parallel with other possibilities. But
on P versus NP it is the most remarkable hypothesis so far:
– by all the practical work and applications that now exist behind it via “T-versions”
(the above examples hardly do justice to the extent of this work: see [12]),
– because this conception has an explanation for the mysterious di?culty of the “P
versus NP” issue,
– and because of Remark 5 below.
Remark 5. – In Section 1 we observed that classical Number theory may have no
use for strong axioms. Here we observe a situation on the move which points out a
possible solution to the “blatant problem” (Remark 1a of Section 1) of the usefulness
of strong axioms in Math:
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(a) axioms as strong as A2 are already useful in the development of Cexible pro-
gramming languages and even ZF set theory starts playing a role here via the
Curry–Howard correspondence,
(b) strong axioms are needed to merely formulate the “working hypothesis” explained
in Remark 4, hence to develop and test it,
(c) in this way strong axioms also give a mathematical content to the otherwise vague
and elusive idea that the Computer theoretic world is immense and mostly unknown
to us: it su?ces to assume that stronger and stronger but still practical properties
of the Computer can be proved by use of ever stronger axioms – ranging from
PRA to ZF and beyond.
As in Section 1 such philosophical discussions would remain hopelessly vague
without the reduced scale experimentation and modelization permitted by the use of
“T-versions” for suitable WAs T: : :
(B) Catch as catch can: P versus NP and Model theory
I do not think that a number theorist would read this paper; but if he did so he
might be surprised by the comparison made between classical Number theory which
eludes Unsolvability – while CS helped by the study of WAs confronts itself with
this supreme challenge! In reality, Number theory was eluding Unsolvability for sound
reasons recalled in Section 1, and not out of fear before challenges – this discipline
is an example to all mathematicians for attacking very hard questions. And when I
wrote that the eluding strategy created a favorable environment in Number theory
I did not say a friendly one; instead I insisted that it also is very challenging. In
fact, the methods which Number theory lately developed in order to face its main
challenges are now crucial to help CS continue the confrontation with P versus NP. For
Remark 0, 4 and 5 eloquently show that this confrontation cannot remain entirely
smooth – sooner or later it has to become “catch as catch can”. And sooner rather
than later: by Remarks 2′+4a, in order to signi@cantly improve on Theorem 1 we
should prove no less than: primality is in P!
Today Number theory rests on algebraic methods. Hence such methods are certainly
required if we are to break the current thresholds in the study of the P versus NP
issue. But since this issue is more general and systematic than the ones of Number
theory (Remark 0c), we shall need the more general and systematic form of Algebra
provided by Algebraic Model theory. Algebraic Model theory is the part of Logic
closest to Algebra and to Algebraic Geometry+Number theory: the cornerstone of
all four domains is the use of well-behaved classes of structures. But the speci@c
feature of Model theory is that as often as possible these classes of structures are 8rst
order; so that we shall speak of well-behaved theories in place of classes of structures.
Model theory developed a great variety of ways for a theory T to be well behaved:
(1) T is complete; (2) T has quanti8er elimination; (3) T is o-minimal (that is: T
proves that every de@nable relation can be partitioned into a @nite number of cells
with de@nable boundaries); (4) T has good representability properties of its models;
(5) T is classi8able (the invariants of each model of T characterize the model up to
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isomorphism); (6) T is stable (if M,N are models of T and M is submodel of N then
the restriction to M of every de@nable subset of N is also de@nable in M); (7) T is
categorical (that is, it has only one model up to isomorphism) in some cardinal(s). Etc.!
Examples of such well-behaved theories – The theory RCF of Real Closed Field
axiomatizes the real @eld; its extension RECF (Real Exponential Closed Field) axiom-
atizes the real @eld expanded by ex. By Tarski’s theorem RCF has the above properties
(1)–(3); by Kaplansky’s theorem [10] RCF also enjoys (4): for every model of T can
be represented as a @eld of trans8nite series. By Wilkie’s theorem [20] RECF has (2)
and (3); it has (4) by [17]. And Macintyre–Wilkie proved that RECF also has (1),
provided Shanuel’s conjecture is true. The theory of algebraically closed @eld (ACF) of
characteristic 0 has properties (1), (2), (5), (6), (7); the theory DCF of Di<erentially
Closed Fields enjoys (2) and (6).
It is not by chance that WAs such as PRA and its weakenings in (A) are counter
examples to all these properties; and that the CWAs of Section 2 have only property
(1) and sometimes (2). Consequently, there has been only few connections in the past,
between WAs and Algebraic Model theory. Thus it seems at @rst that WAs are not
concerned by the present (B); but things have started to change: see Remark 6 below.
Quite an important and promising change for the study of WAs – as the rest of this
survey is going to explain.
Remark 6. (a) Krajicek [13] obtained the (so far) best lower bounds results on the
length of proof of tautologies (question Q′3 above), by use of Model theory and of
the existence of an Euler characteristic de@ned over all real algebraic varieties.
(The latter is a theorem of vd Dries which is an application of o-minimality of the
theory RCF.)
(b) Theorem 1b is tied up with the model theory of RECF (For a non technical
account of this remarkable intertwining between WA and Algebraic Model theory, see
[17])
(c) Blum–Schub–Smale [3] developed a model of calculability where the digits of
numbers in binary presentation are replaced by the elements of any ring; and Smale
used this to de@ne versions of P =NP where the digits are replaced for instance by
real or complex numbers (standard or not). Poizat [14] extended the BSS model of
calculability as well as Smale’s versions of P =NP, so that the ring can be replaced by
any structure and we have “T-versions of P versus NP” where T equals for instance
the above theory DCF. One interesting feature of such T-versions is that they very
directly need Algebraic Model theory to be investigated – see [6, 15]. On the other
hand and as of today, Smale’s versions of “P versus NP” are as mysterious as the
original versions; so it is not certain that they lead to more solvable problems than the
original ones. But one is encouraged in thinking so by a similarity between them and
the versions of classical Number theory where function @elds replace integers.
Parenthesis: weak Analysis and WAs. The above theories RCF, RECF, DCF are
examples of “weak Analysis” since they are about real and complex numbers. Analysis
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is interpretable in 2d order Arithmetic, so one could say such theories are WAs: : : only
the integers are NOT de@nable in these theories – otherwise they would never have
their above good behavior properties. But here is a long list of ties between WAs on
the one hand, and weak-because-integerless Analysis on the other hand.
(a) Since integers are among the reals, universal statements and also schemes of state-
ments {A(sn(0)); n¡!} of Analysis do concern integers.
(b) RCF and RECF are CWAs, and they have a smallest model which consists of all
real algebraic and exponential-algebraic numbers.
(c) From now on we deal with both theories RCF and RECF by just writing: R(E)CF.
Every model R of R(E)CF has an Integral Part Z ; in other words, (R; Z) is model
of the weak 2d order Arithmetic R(E)CFI. In addition, whenever R
is non-archimedean, one can in addition choose Z so that the fraction @eld of
Z is dense in R! Since the fraction @eld is interpretable in the ring, these proper-
ties of (R; Z) can be expressed by a theory IR(E)CF satis@ed by (the restriction
of R to) Z . Thus we interpret the weak Analysis R(E)CF in the weak Arithmetic
IR(E)CF.
(d) Note the di<erence between this IR(E)CF which is a theory of discrete unitary
rings Z , and the above R(E)CFI which is two sorted with a @eld R and a subring
Z . A more surprising di<erence is that the two sorted R(E)CFI is true (in the
standard model (R;Z)) while IR(E)CF is false (in Z=(Z;+; : ; xy). For IRCF
proves the rationality of every de@nable element of R. Never mind: IR(E)CF is
conservative over true Arithmetic. For if IR(E)CF proves a statement of the form
“for all x1 : : : xnA(x1 : : : xn)” with each quanti@er inside A bounded by some term,
then this statement is true in Z. Moreover, Theorem 1 and the witnessing property
remain true for IRECF.
[Non-standard Analysis heuristically suggests certain algorithms to replace Coat-
ing point calculations, but it is di?cult to rigorously justify these algorithms or
to @nd out when and how they can be e?cient. A result such as the above con-
servation and witnessing properties of IRECF perhaps o<ers an approach to this
problem.]
(e) The proof of these ties between R(E)CF, R(E)CFI and IR(E)CF goes roughly as
follows: (i) if R is archimedean, take Z equal to Z (ii) otherwise by the repre-
sentability property (4) of RECF there is a @eld of trans8nite series R′ which can
be identi@ed with R. In R′, the series having all their terms in8nitely large or equal
to a standard integer form the desired Integral Part Z : : :
[Such arguments are also behind Theorem 1b; may be the reader starts to agree
when I say that the P versus NP issue is becoming “catch as catch can”: : : Due to
the work of Ecalle, van der Hoeven [9] and a bunch of model theorists, Integral
Parts similar to the above Z play a growing role in the study of natural (non-
archimedean but standard) @elds of functions over R. Thus, “pseudo-integers”
satisfying speci@c WAs are now behind the scene in Analysis: : :]
In conclusion of this parenthesis, there are plenty of reasons to consider the study
of complete weak theories of Analysis as part of the studies in WAs. So in the sequel
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the ‘A’ in “WA” will both mean “Arithmetic” and “Analysis”. Actually, we already
started this practice when we appended point (c) to Remark 6.
Remark 7. (a) There are numerous advantages in working inside a well-behaved @rst
order theory T: one may work both syntactically and semantically, as is @tting in each
particular case; one is usually able to settle a question both if the answer is yes and
if it is no; etc.
(b) The trouble is that if a problem P is deep, P is rarely expressible in any such
T. For instance, if T is to be decidable, we have the obstacle that T necessarily has
dramatic restrictions on its expressive power. In particular, T then cannot interpret
both sum and product of integers – which makes T in a sense more limited than a 10
year old child! And more generally T cannot interpret R. Robinson’s Arithmetic Q –
an outrageous restriction. Theories T well behaved in the model theoretic senses we
discussed raise the same di?culty.
(c) In Algebraic Model theory the way to make up for this di?culty to “capture”
the problem P inside any well-behaved theory, is to break the solution of P into a
(often endless) sequence of (schemes of) lemmas Li which take place in suitable well-
behaved theories Ti. Exhausting as this may be, it is the most e?cient method to handle
very hard problems: except for the insistence on @rst-order theories it is the one of
Algebraic Geometry+Number theory : : :
(d) Such a method induces a permanent and systematic struggle in order to capture
many properties inside well-behaved theories – precisely the ones in which such a
capture is di?cult.
As a @nal remark of Section 3: it makes an intensive use of proof theoretic, of prob-
abilistic, of combinatorial, and of (non-standard as well as algebraic) model theoretic
methods: : :
4. Banishing unsolvability: WAs and mathematical “paradises”
The eluding strategy of Section 1 takes place in a mathematical universe where
Unsolvability Courishes. In contrast with this situation, if one chooses to work in the
framework provided by a decidable CWA, one completely banishes Unsolvability. Alas,
as explained in Remark 7 of Section 3 such a framework is usually far too narrow for
becoming any mathematician’s main framework.
But there are a few exceptions. One is the theory RCF: since its “well behavior” has
been proved by Tarski, it has become such a convenient framework for Real Geometry
that it has lead this part of Algebraic Geometry to become a mathematical discipline
of its own. Another exception is SiS, the Monadic Arithmetic with i successors: among
others, its fundamental results provide the theoretical background for the design of real
time processors satisfying for a given speci@cation – a large-scale industry which is
vital for modern technology: : :
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Thus some exceptional CWAs are mathematical “paradises” able to provide a friendly
environment for a whole coherent domain in Math or in CS or both. Can we multiply
or enlarge these exceptions? In the case of RCF, the answer to this question recently
became an emphatic yes. For the good properties of RCF are kept not only by RECF,
but by many additional extensions, so that a whole branch of Model theory has devel-
oped around them (and more generally around “o-minimality”: see [7]). In the case of
SiS the answer is still wide open but with encouraging perspectives: see the remark
after Theorem 4 of [8] in the present volume.
This quest for mathematical paradises is an exploration of certain CWAs, hence it
is a natural chapter in our subject. The part of this quest relative to extensions of RCF
is also a chapter in Algebraic Model theory and in Real Geometry – this indicates the
methods on which it rests. The part relative to extensions of SiS rests on Automata
theory and on Model theory; but (see [8] in the present volume) it looks as if ideas
coming from (strong!) Set theory are also going to play a role in this search for
weak-but-paradisiacal theories: : :
General conclusion (and suggestions for future JAFs)
(a) In Section 1 – Section 4, I presented four ways in which the study of WAs is
contributing to Math and CS. And for the sake of intelligibility I was stressing
the di<erences among the four ways. But let me now stress the convergences. The
studies in WA reviewed from Section 1–Section 4 share together and share with
Algebraic Model theory the two main features mentioned in Remark 7:
– they deal with 8rst-order theories and make intensive use of this feature
– they rest on a permanent and systematic e<ort in order to capture salient prop-
erties and results, inside theories which by nature have a weak (proving or
expressive) power that makes the capture be sporty.
No doubt it shall be fruitful to make a pool of these parallel e<orts, by devel-
oping a common culture around them, by comparing their methods+ ideas and
by having a common reCection on the general problem of capturing valuable
properties inside weak theories.
(b) For lack of time and space, I skipped three points that should have been developed
here:
1. The connection between WAs and 8nite Arithmetic+Model theory.
2. The reasons why insistence on 8rst order is an important and fruitful feature
of the subject.
3. The intimate connection of WAs with the study and use of “abstract
machines” (fortunately, this aspect is dealt with in D. Richard’s intro-
duction).
(c) Relying on the latter contribution I did not survey the mainstream aspects of JAF.
Instead, I surveyed some sidepaths and did my best to show that they are quite
attractive: they o<er a coherent widening of our topic which allows the study
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of WAs to play more than ever the role of a dynamic interface between many
disciplines of Math and CS: : :
But in order to take advantage of this widening: (i) an additional public should be
attracted to JAF; (ii) and the present public should be proposed some background
on the less familiar part of the themes I have been waiving. For satisfying both
(ii) and (i) at once, I will propose the following to the Program Committee of
JAF: that future sessions include introductory lectures exploring in a more precise
way these less familiar themes; and that the lectures be made by adequate speakers
who had so far little contact with JAF.
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